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THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT
OF JUSTICE
MORTON J. HoRwiTz*
From 1953, when Earl Warren became Chief Justice, to 1969, when
Earl Warren stepped down as Chief Justice, a constitutional revolution
occurred. Constitutional revolutions are rare in American history. Indeed,
the only constitutional revolution prior to the Warren Court was the New
Deal Revolution of 1937, which fundamentally altered the relationship
between the federal government and the states and between the government
and the economy. Prior to 1937, there had been great continuity in American
constitutional history. The first sharp break occurred in 1937 with the New
Deal Court. The second sharp break took place between 1953 and 1969
with the Warren Court. Whether we will experience a comparable turn after
1969 remains to be seen. Clearly, however, some of the resonances of the
Warren Court continued through the Burger Court and perhaps even later.
The constitutional revolution embarked upon by the Warren Court was
based on two general conceptions that may have been in conflict. The first
was the idea of a living constitution: a constitution that evolves according
to changing values and circumstances. The second was marked by the
reemergence of the discourse of rights as a dominant constitutional mode.
I. THm LrviNG CONSMUTrON
The late eighteenth century idea of a constitution was based on new-
tonian conceptions of separation of powers and checks and balances. The
idea was to create that perfect governmental machine designed to last
forever. This model represented a static conception of a constitution as
fixed for all time. In the second half of the nineteenth century, legal thought
shifted under the influence of Darwinism and evolutionary theory. Legal
thinkers for the first time talked about law as changing according to
changing circumstances. Remarkably, however, this change did not funda-
mentally affect constitutional thought, though you can find Darwinian
influences elsewhere in the law. In most other legal areas-in jurisprudence,
in torts, in contracts-evolutionary thought did have a major impact. But
in constitutional thought there was relatively little recognition of change by
the end of the nineteenth century. Originalism remained the dominant mode
of discourse. The notion that the Constitution and constitutional meaning
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were fixed for all time was a regular part of the way in which people
continued to think about law.
Why was constitutional law different? Sanford Levinson of the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School has called the Constitution "America's civic
religion."' Indeed, this serves to underline an important relationship between
religious and legal thought in the nineteenth century. As the power of
religion reached its zenith in the second half of the nineteenth century, and
then began to decline amid an ever more secular society, one begins to see
the shift from religion to law as a dominant American public concern.
Perhaps the Constitution represented the displacement of religious ideas. If
the Constitution constitutes civic religion and if modes of religious thinking
affected much of constitutional thinking, then the notion of timeless truths
that are unchanging was carried over from religious to constitutional thought.
Constitutional thought became the sublimation of declining religious thought.
So while late nineteenth century legal thought had been widely influenced
by Darwinism and evolutionary thought, it did not, in fact, create such a
way of thinking in constitutional thought. Why?
Beginning in the 1890s, thinkers started to emphasize the significance
of rapid social change. It was argued that the old individualist ethic was
anachronistic as a result of a shift from an agricultural to a concentrated,
industrialized economy. More frequently, legal thinkers asserted that the
Constitution was out of touch with changing times. For example, the
doctrine of freedom of contract, as elaborated in Lochner v. New York,
2
was no longer appropriate for an industrial society in which individual
laborers could not freely contract with large industrial corporations. In the
generation before 1937, a growing body of thought suggested that it was
not possible to talk about the Constitution as having a fixed and permanent
meaning. Though the living Constitution concept was a widespread theme
in the period leading up to 1937, it virtually vanished after 1937. Why?
The legal thinkers who justified the New Deal constitutional revolution
after 1937 explained their triumph not as a constitutional revolution but as
a restoration of neutral constitutional principles. The errant Lochner Court,
they said, had written its own parochial views into the Constitution during
the late nineteenth century. They had endowed the Constitution with the
Justices' own ideas of natural law. Because the Lochner Court had been
overcome by "mechanical jurisprudence," it had applied legal ideas badly
and had created a monster. Under the doctrine of judicial restraint, the
New Dealers claimed they were restoring the Constitution to its pre-Lochner
Court status. Thus, the New Deal constitutional revolution was not justified
under a conception of a changing Constitution, but rather as a restoration
of unchanging neutral principles embodied in the original Constitution.
Which of us, after coming to power, would not be tempted to justify our
changes as a restoration of constitutional principles and not as a "consti-
1. SAMFoRD LEviNSON, CONsTIuTIONAL FAITH (1988).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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tutional revolution"? It is too tempting to turn to the conservative, restor-
ative idea rather than to openly acknowledge a constitutional revolution
that needs to be justified. As a result, intellectual opportunism immediately
suppressed the issue of how to think about a changing Constitution after
the New Deal revolution.
The question of how to conceptualize the Constitution arose again with
Brown v. Board of Education.3 As Brown was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and about to be argued for the first and then the second
time, the likelihood of a unanimous Supreme Court decision holding that
the "separate but equal doctrine" of Plessy v. Ferguson4 was unconstitu-
tional was extremely low. The Supreme Court, by 1950, had signalled to
those who were pressing for racial equality that it would thereafter be
almost impossible, given the actual unequal conditions of segregated public
education, to satisfy the separate but equal standard. The opponents of
segregation were thus offered the promise of a strictly applied separate but
equal standard that would virtually guarantee the illegality of most segre-
gated school systems. However, litigation under the separate but equal
standard would require a case by case attack on segregated schools that
would necessitate a costly and time consuming creation of a trial record
that could demonstrate actual, "material" inequality. It might take fifty or
one hundred years to end segregation this way, but it would gradually be
eliminated. Thus, the likelihood that the Supreme Court might reaffirm the
separate but equal doctrine under a very rigorous standard that for most
of American history had never been applied seemed quite high. Conse-
quently, Brown v. Board of Education was not some inevitable expression
of American ideals. Rather, it was a quite surprising and perhaps even
miraculous moment in American constitutional history.
When the Supreme Court considered Brown v. Board of Education, it
had to decide what it was going to say about Plessy v. Ferguson. Although
the Brown Court stated that separate education facilities are "inherently
unequal," 5 Brown v. Board of Education tiptoed around Plessy v. Ferguson,
rather than expressly overruling it, thus blurring the question of whether
the Constitution changes over time. The famous social science footnote
eleven 6 was basically designed to say that "[t]hese social psychology studies
show that. segregation is stigmatizing to blacks and, hence, is inherently
unequal." The footnote was also designed to suggest that the Justices who
decided Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 had not had all of this modern social
science information before them. Thus, the Court implicitly reasoned that
what the Plessy Court thought in 1896 might have been correct and what
we think now, in 1954, can also be correct. The Court implied that the
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
6. Id. at 495 n.11.
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different results stemmed from different applications of the guarantee of
equal protection to the changing circumstances of public education and to
deeper understandings of intangible harms that the study of human psy-
chology had made possible. Viewed from this perspective, Brown v. Board
of Education raised the momentous issue of whether there was a changing
Constitution.
Plessy v. Ferguson was the result of twenty years of racist decisions by
the United States Supreme Court after federal troops were withdrawn from
the South and the Great Compromise of 1877 signalled to the South that
it could reinstitute segregation without interference. But for the judges who
were deciding Brown v. Board of Education, the desire not to offend the
South and not to directly overturn almost a century of Supreme Court
decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment was very powerful. Accordingly,
the theory of a changing Constitution, a living Constitution, a Constitution
that could be interpreted in one way in 1896 and in another in 1954, received
a lot of discussion. Out of this seed in Brown v. Board of Education there
sprouted, during the Warren Court's tenure, a very powerful view held
among several of the Justices that constitutions cannot be static, but are
designed to change. A constitution meant to endure for ages can only endure
if it adapts to different views held under different circumstances.
II. RiGTs DIscousE
In addition to the concept of the Constitution's ability to evolve, the
second major constitutional development brought about by the Warren
Court revolution was the resurrection of rights discourse. In 1940, most
progressive legal thinkers had come to believe that the theory of natural
rights was a conservative doctrine designed to protect private property and
should best be left out of interpretations of the Constitution. In one of its
previous appearances it had been invoked in Dred Scott v. Sanford' to
defend property and, indeed, slavery. Thus, one of the most amazing
reversals in modern constitutional history is how a doctrine held in such
low esteem, so discredited in 1940, came to be used by the Warren Court
to represent a liberatory, emancipatory, and outsider's way of talking about
the law. One of the most fascinating aspects of the Warren Court revolution
is the resurrection of rights discourse which, prior to the Warren Court's
tenure, had been more or less discredited among Progressives.
The Warren Court developed and changed several legal doctrines. First,
of course, was the monumental decision in Brown v. Board of Education
and its echo in dozens of cases during the years of the Warren Court. Even
those Warren Court cases that are doctrinally not about race are almost
always, in one way or another, ultimately about the agony of race relations
in America. For example, New York Times v. Sullivan,8 which held for the
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
8. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
[Vol. 50:5
THE WARREN COURT
first time that state common-law rules about defamation are restricted by
the First Amendment, involved an attempt by the State of Alabama to
force newspapers that published pro-desegregation advertisements out of
business. By invoking the First Amendment against libel laws, the Supreme
Court acted in a context in which it was becoming very clear that the threat
of bankruptcy was being directed against newspapers in order to uphold
segregation. Similarly, if you study those cases collected under the heading
of "federalism," or if you examine the criminal law decisions of the Warren
Court, you can grasp the extent to which race is the central, often unack-
nowledged, factor in the decisions. So I think of Brown v. Board of
Education, decided one year after Earl Warren became Chief Justice, as
setting the central theme of the Warren Court. It was both the basis for
the development of rights discourse as well as the development of the idea
of a living constitution.
Under Warren's Chief Justiceship, the Supreme Court also radically
transformed the application of the Bill of Rights to the states. Until the
Civil War, the Bill of Rights was held not to apply to the states. As of the
time Earl Warren became Chief Justice, the First Amendment had already
been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. There were also several other areas in which the Bill of Rights had
begun to infiltrate into the Due Process Clause. But it was the Warren
Court that over the course of one decade incorporated most of the remaining
provisions of the Bill of Rights as restrictions on the states.
In the area of reapportionment, the Warren Court affected a political,
as well as a legal, revolution. Not only did the one-man, one-vote idea
correct a strongly antiurban bias in existing state political structures, but
the system of judicial enforcement developed in the reapportionment cases,
growing out of the desegregation cases, radically expanded the equity power
of the federal courts. It foreshadowed a more interventionist federal judi-
ciary in prisons and other public institutions. Before Brown and the reap-
portionment cases, federal courts were unwilling to craft the kind of decrees
that have now become more or less usual in many forms.
Within Warren Court jurisprudence there developed a contradiction
between its "living constitution" ideas and its "rights" ideas. Where did
its rights ideas come from? We can find no better text with which to begin
discussion of rights than the Declaration of Independence. "We hold these
truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal and they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." It was this tradition that
came to be regarded as anachronistic. The Warren Court thus revived the
revolutionary spirit of rights discourse after it had been debased in the
protection of slavery and, arguably, in the protection of property. But -the
rights idea was an eighteenth century newtonian idea. A static conception
of self-evident truths, endowed by a creator as inalienable, as there for all
time, as unchanging. The living constitution idea, by contrast, regarded
constitutions as changing and changeable depending on the circumstances.
Both of these ideas coexisted in the Warren Court and they continue to
coexist uncomfortably today.
1993]
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Now I wish to shift to a slightly different perspective about the Warren
Court. The Warren Court was the first and, so far, the only Court in
American history that emphathized with the outsider. I have gone back over
different periods in American history, and I have tried to be fairly generous
and not historically bound in my definition of the outsider. Still, I do not
see an arguable competitor. The Warren Court was unique. The Warren
Court was the first Court in American history that really identified with
those who are down and out-the people who received the raw deal, those
who are the outsiders, the marginal, the stigmatized. It was the first
sympathetic treatment that blacks received from the Supreme Court, with
the arguable exception of the decade after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868. Moreover, not only blacks but other minorities-
religious minorities, political dissenters, illegitimates, poor people, prisoners
and accused criminals received sympathetic treatment.
Brown v. Board of Education set the theme for this aspect of the
Warren Court as well. The Supreme Court did not arrive at the declaration
that separate facilities are inherently unequal enthusiastically. It was pushed
in that direction by many circumstances involving the place of America in
the world. Looking back to Nazism or across the ocean to Stalinism,
Americans after 1945 were obsessed with defining and defending democratic
principles. They were increasingly made aware of the emergence of the
Third World. The experience of black fighting men in segregated units
during World War II reopened issues of second class citizenship.
The Supreme Court was also pressed by the unbelievably courageous
behavior of President Truman in the area of civil rights. He split the
Democratic Party and risked his re-election mainly because of his really
unbending devotion to the civil rights of black Americans, a devotion that
does not appear to be very prominent in his biography before he became
President.
So Brown v. Board of Education created this powerful current, pro-
ducing a vision of American society that was radically different from the
complacent view that preceded it. Eventually, it overflowed its bounds. The
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, I am suggesting, shifted the
Warren Court to an outsider perspective. Let me go further and propose
that the Justices who made up the Warren Court majority were, in different
and complicated ways, themselves outsiders. There was Justice Black, the
Senior Justice of the Warren Court majority, who had been on the Court
for sixteen years when Warren was appointed Chief Justice. He had been
a Senator from Alabama, a member of the Ku Klux Klan. It was often
said that you could not get elected to the Senate from Alabama unless you
had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Black's previous career as a
prosecutor was heralded as racially fair and just by the standards of Alabama
in the 1930s. He was one of the first two Justices to insist that Brown v.
Board of Education needed to decide that segregation was inherently une-
qual. How was Black an outsider? An evangelical Baptist who was outside
of the mainstream of sophisticated eastern establishment legal thought,
Black carried the Constitution in his pocket the way his Baptist forbearers
[Vol. 50:5
THE WARREN COURT
carried the Bible in their pockets. He had the same literalist interpretation
of the Constitution that his Baptists ancestors had of the Bible. If Black
was an outsider, he was a regional and cultural outsider. Black did not
know what was being thought about the Constitution at Harvard and Yale
Law Schools.
Justice Douglas, the second senior member, referred to himself as an
outsider in his autobiography.9 A sickly child, with no friends, he built his
body up with long backpacks through the Washington Mountains, rode
hobo trains across the country, and was suspicious of the religious, political,
and economic "establishment" from the time he was a young man. In
Douglas' magnificent first volume, Go East Young Man, he portrays himself
as the very essence of a loner with deep empathy for those who did not
"make it." 1°
The third member of the Warren Court in seniority was Earl Warren,
appointed in 1953 by President Eisenhower in return for Warren's having
thrown the 1952 Republican Convention to Eisenhower. He had been
Governor of California and before that a prosecutor. He had participated
in the internment of the Japanese-Americans during the Second World War.
In his subsequent reflections on his role in the internment of Japanese-
Americans, Warren identified the internments as a traumatic experience that
had had a powerful effect on him personally and led him eventually to
acknowledge that an egregious mistake had been made. But Warren too
was an outsider to sophisticated legal culture. When I was in law school,
it was common to mock Warren for often asking from the bench whether
a particular legal position was "just." Sophisticated legal scholars did not
speak that way. This is the sense in which I mean that Warren-and Black-
were outsiders to sophisticated legal culture.
In any other supreme court of a democratic nation, you would not find
a Black or a Warren. The channels of promotion and recruitment to the
supreme courts of most democracies is much more professionalized, much
more controlled by one's standing at the Bar. One who is appointed to the
highest court of Britain, France, or practically any other democratic country,
has usually spent a lifetime of distinction at the Bar, often as a lower court
judge. Only in America do politicians become Supreme Court Justices, and
Black and Warren were politicians. Only in America have Supreme Court
appointees been able to remain out of touch with the latest thinking on
federal jurisdiction. And only in America are Supreme Court Justices not
necessarily already trained out of asking the question, "is it just." Black
and Warren brought something special and unique to the Supreme Court.
When it came to defining the agenda of the Warren Court, their deep
political experience served them well, allowing them to draw upon knowledge
of the way law actually works in America, something that a more profes-
9. WImnum 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAsT YoUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEAsS (1974).
10. Id.
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sionalized and sophisticated judge like Felix Frankfurter was unwilling to
do.
The Justice I have the greatest difficulty in fitting into my "outsider"
thesis, because so little of the details of his biography is yet known, is the
greatest justice of the Warren Court-William Brennan-who I think will
clearly be regarded in the judgment of history as among the greatest of all
American Supreme Court Justices. Brennan was appointed in another fluke.
As the 1956 congressional elections were nearing, President Eisenhower
decided he needed help with the Catholic vote. So he began a search for a
Catholic Democrat to appoint. His Attorney General consulted Chief Justice
Arthur Vanderbilt of New Jersey who suggested that a young fellow named
Brennan on the New Jersey Supreme Court should be appointed. Justice
Brennan's authorized biography is a year or two away from appearing. We
still know very little about Brennan's background. But let me propose,
without pretending that it is enough to make the case, that as the only
Roman Catholic on the Supreme Court, Brennan was different. In many
parts of the country, in much of American history, Roman Catholics have
deeply felt like outsiders. Whether and to what extent this was true of
Justice Brennan remains to be seen.
Next, we have Arthur Goldberg, appointed in 1962 as Felix Frankfurter's
successor. A Jew, and counsel to the CIO steelworkers union, Goldberg
was involved with the CIO when it was a quite radical industrial union. He
was engaged in the intense labor struggles of the 1930s. Arthur Goldberg
can clearly be fit into outsiders status; and his successor, when Goldberg
left three years later for the U.N. Ambassadorship believing that President
Johnson would appoint him Secretary of State, was Abe Fortas. Fortas was
also a Jew, a New Dealer, and founder of the New Deal law firm of Arnold
& Porter. In her excellent biography of Abe Fortas, Laura Kalman's analysis
begins with the assumption that Abe Fortas felt himself, always, to be an
outsider. 
The final liberal member of the Warren Court was Thurgood Marshall.
I suppose I need not explain too much why he was an outsider. Chief
counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, he was the architect of the
organization's legal strategy against segregation and spent many years of
his life not knowing whether he would be murdered before he awoke the
next morning in whichever town he had brought the battle against segre-
gation. Mark Tushnet of Georgetown University Law School is writing a
two volume biography of Justice Marshall, so we are going to have to wait
a while before we are treated to a full account of Marshall's life.
All of these justices were, in their different ways, outsiders. They
empathized with outsiders in ways that another distinguished judge of the
Warren court, Justice John Marshall Harlan, could not do. His privileged
life experiences-prep school, Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship, Oxford, part-
11. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIorRAPHY 7-26 (Yale Univ. Press 1990).
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nership in a large New York law firm-did not encourage him to think
about outsiders.
So, in my view, the Warren Court represented a unique period in
American constitutional history. It did not just happen, nor was it a random
event, except for the constellation of the justices who were appointed. In
biographical as well as social and historical terms, it produced a major
turning point in American constitutional history.

